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In this interview with Annemarie Mol we explored important aspects of her 
academic production. We deal with themes such as: Multiple Bodies, Political 
Ontologies and the Logic of Care. Annemarie Mol (1958) researches at the 
confluence of philosophy, medical sociology, anthropology, the sociology of science, 
and social theory. She studied medicine (a free doctorate that after the ordinary BA 
mainly included social sciences of health care) and philosophy at the University of 
Utrecht. She completed her doctorate in philosophy at the University of Gronigen 
in 1989. Between 1990 and 1995, she worked as a post-doctoral fellow at the 
University of Maastricht and the University of Utrecht. In 1996, she was nominated 
Socrates Professor of Political Philosophy and senior researcher at the University 
of Twente. In 2008, she was named Socrates Professor of Social Theory at the 
University of Amsterdam. In 2010, she became a professor of Anthropology of 
the Body at the University of Amsterdam. Her books include: Ziek is het woord 
niet (with Peter van Lieshout); “Differences in Medicine” (edited with Marc 
Berg); “Complexities” (edited with John Law); “Care in Practice” (edited with 
Ingunn Moser and Jeannette Pols); and the single authored monographs “The 
Body Multiple; and The Logic of Care”, as well as numerous articles in specialized 
journals. Annemarie Mol kindly agreed to answer the questions posed by Denise 
Martin, Mary Jane Spink and Pedro Paulo Gomes Pereira.
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 In “The Body Multiple”
1, you show how bodies are manipulated through various practices. In 
order to do away with the dichotomy between the body we have and the body we are, you 
remind us that we do our bodies in everyday practices: we perform, we enact, we stage. We 
ask, therefore: How do we deal with our bodies? How is it possible to investigate the bodies 
that we do?
There are many ways to investigate the bodies we do. In “The Body Multiple”1 my investigation 
focused on hospital practices related to vascular disease, atherosclerosis, particularly of the leg 
vessels. The body ‘we’ do in that setting, is done by a wide “we”: all kinds of people and apparatus 
are involved. The patient’s whose arteries are at stake actively participates in these doings. In the 
consulting room she talks (asks and answers questions) and takes of trousers and socks if required 
and allows the doctor to feel out the pulsations of her arteries and the condition of her skin. In the 
laboratory she contributes by rather not talking, or not too much, but allowing the technician to 
measure. For instance, to measure the difference between the blood pressure in the ankle and the 
arms. Or to measure the blood velocity through the leg arteries. Those are different measurements: 
the first does the disease as a fall in blood pressure, the second “does” it as a local increase in blood 
velocity. These ways of “doing” atherosclerosis both differ from the conversation between patient and 
doctor that earlier took place in the consulting room, where the disease rather takes the shape ‘pain 
upon walking’ and “weak pulsations” or a “badly nourished skin”.
However, it is also possible to investigate the body this or that “we” performs in other settings 
– outside the hospital. In the consulting room of dieticians, for instance. There it is not “pain upon 
walking” but, for instance, “overweight” that is the crucial problem tackled. In relation to that, 
people’s bodies are done as either greedy, or as needing nutrients, or as used to certain kinds of 
food, and so on2. Or they are done rather differently, as lacking in satisfaction, or as craving care and 
hungering for love3.
How it is possible to study all that? By attending to what happens in a practice, wondering what 
each of the elements in the scene suggest about the reality (problem, concern) at stake in that 
practice, asking those present questions so as to learn about their take on things, reading around. 
And most importantly: by also study other practices and learn about both from the contrasts between 
them.
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Along the same lines, how do we deal with illness? How can we think and talk about illness?
As I have studied physical diseases mostly, in most of what I wrote the doing of the body and 
the doing of illness flow over into each other. Even if my body multiple book is called “The Body 
Multiple”1 the multiple it displays is primarily the disease ‘atherosclerosis’ rather than ‘the body’. But 
‘Disease multiple’ would have been a less intriguing title. At the same time: different versions of a 
disease and different versions of the body go together. An anatomical version of atherosclerosis is 
situated in a spatial body. A body served by arteries with a certain width. This may be narrowed by a 
plaque. That is called a stenosis. 
Physiology, by contrasts, suggests that atherosclerosis is not a structure in space but a process over 
time – in which plaque may gradually form. Hence, it also envisions as processual body, constantly 
transforming. And then there is a daily life version, which is translates in the hospital to a clinical 
version, of both body and disease. Here, the body is something lived with from day to day, hour to 
hour and the disease atherosclerosis takes the shape pain upon walking. 
The crux of drawing out these distinctions is that going with one version or the other has different 
practical consequences. Pain upon walking may gradually diminish if a person walks a lot – twice a day 
for at least twenty minutes. But while walking solves the problem pain, it doesn’t alter the fact that the 
artery has a stenosis. Hence, if walking therapy is evaluated by measuring the width of the vessel it 
seems to fail, while if it is evaluated by assessing the complaints it is successful. An interesting tension, 
a relevant clash. 
You use the term “enact” to show that objects (such as body and disease) exist as articulations 
of the practices that produce them. As you have shown, disease arises through the different modes 
through which it is enacted. Enact carries the sense both of staging and of causing to exist, of acting. 
Could you comment a little more about this central concept in “The Body Multiple”1 (such as, for 
example, in relation to Judith Butler’s theory of performativity)?
There is not much difference between the way I use enact and the way Judith Butler writes about 
the “performance” of reality. Performance has a historical background in which there was a ‘true’ 
reality behind the stage where reality is performed. Butler doesn’t think there is a back-stage, but some 
of my reviewers did. That is one reason that I didn’t use the term: I wanted to avoid that connotation. 
But listen, enacting has nothing to do with causing. Nor with making. Those are words that stress 
the past (in which ‘causes’ lie; or when “making” happened) and they stabilize the outcome, the 
present. The crux of the shift to performing/enacting is that the present itself is and remains unstable. 
There is a here and now, in which ‘doing’ happens, but it is “not” explained by what went before – 
there are patterns and routines, but there is also always the possibility of surprise. 
“The Body Multiple”1 is a powerful statement about praxiography, about practicalities and 
materialities, and about a type of ethnographic method that converses with multiplicity. As 
you say, doctors and patients ascribe meaning in different ways. However, practices at some 
point become words: either through field notes or though conversation about what one is 
doing. And these discursive practices are composites of linguistic repertoires that are embedded 
in meanings; hence, in interpretations, or differing versions. How, then, may we conciliate 
practices and discourses (or records) about practices? How can we consider language as 
practice?
There is a misunderstanding here, a confusion. I do not say that doctors and patients ascribe meaning 
in different ways. I tell that other authors have worked that out and that I want to take a further step, 
go beyond that. I hope to tell an additional story, which is that doctors and patients perform, or enact, 
reality “together”. So rather than the difference between them, I stress their collaboration. Doctors 
and patients collaborate, they need each other to do the reality of a disease. Without a patient telling 
about her/his concerns and complaints, a doctor has nothing to attach meaning to. And without a 
doctor offering explanations, diagnostic tools and treatments, the patient has problems, but these are 
not ‘atherosclerosis’.
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 The linguistic repertoires relevant to this collaboration do not come “after” them – they are a “part” of what happens in hospitals. This is different for my field notes – that, I would say, are 
particular kinds of digestions of what happens in the hospital. They are fairly irrelevant to hospital 
practices then and there, but they are in their turn part of other practices. Academic ones, maybe 
policy conversations, they could be made relevant in teaching – also teaching in medical schools – or in 
framing new research.
It is fully well possible to study language-in-practice. Of course, in many human practices there is 
a lot of talk! As it happens, it is one of my more recent projects to explore that. I am more particularly 
interested, one, in how this talk relates to the bodies of those present in the situation and, two, in the 
differences between languages-in-practice. For the fact that international academic work gets done in 
English has huge consequences for what we end up writing. You might like this, I hope you do: with 
a colleague who is an anthropologist working in Bahia we have written about the difference between 
chupar fruta and comer fruta4. About the way the practices that are linked to those words differ – and 
do not neatly map onto practices that one can talk or write about in English4. 
In “The Body Multiple”1, you state: “…what I want to stress for now is just this one thing: 
that my theoretical investigation into the coexistence of the various versions of a multiple 
object were, indeed, localized1” (p. 182). What does “localized” actually mean in the context 
of praxiography? Is the size of the field of little importance for praxiography? Can one follow 
practicalities and materialities when the field has no boundaries?
Localized here means situated. The point is that the ‘atherosclerosis multiple’ that I learned about in 
hospital Z, where I did my research, happens “there” and nowhere else. Things are already different in 
a hospital ten kilometers away. And if someone else would use similar research methods to study this 
atherosclerosis in a hospital in Bordeaux, Osaka, Salvador, she would not find different versions of this 
disease that would be coordinated in different ways. 
The specificities of the field are therefore of great importance for praxiography – a practice is 
always somewhere, never everywhere. But I am not so sure that we do well to talk about this in terms 
of “size”. For practices are small or large, they are things that happen – they take place in time. The 
more relevant question might well be if they happen rarely or frequently. Not how big they are, but 
how often they occur. 
I wonder why you talk about a field having no boundaries – it was a criticism on the notion of the 
network that networks have no boundaries. But fields actually do – take the metaphor literally, fields – 
like meadows or football fields – have a limit. That said, practices tend to not stay stuck in fields. They 
travel and hence a researcher may try to follow them around as they travel.
What a praxiographer cannot do is fully map out a field – in its totality, as a whole about we 
may tell everything there is to say. Instead, praxiographic research rather resembles following a trail, 
walking a path. As researcher I can be present in one moment and then in another and wonder how 
they are connected. Likewise, I can ask questions in one place and then another and wonder what 
kind of links there might be between them. For instance, in Hanoi people eat the same kind of bread 
as in Paris – if not as long baguettes, but far shorter. Does that mean that these two cities jointly form 
a field? No, Hanoi bread eating is rather an interesting trace of its French colonial past. It raises the 
question how it is that French bread has endured there for many decades after the French left. It must 
have something in its favor that locally make sense. Or taste good.
In science and technology studies there have been lots of interesting studies into technology 
transfer. They have critiqued the idea that a technology that works in one particular place works 
always and everywhere, works in general. Some ‘thing’ only works in a site if the conditions of 
possibility that allow for its working are in place. If you pick it up and transport a tool, machine or 
other thing – bread ! – to another setting, the question is always what will it do there, in that second 
site? Will it be accepted, celebrated, fail, fall apart? That is something that a researcher following the 
technology in question can study. Without the need to then say something general that would be true 
in other places.
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It would be interesting to think of places and journeys, of topological figures such as networks, 
fluids, and regions. Could you speak more about the concept of topology?
Yes, I can say more about topology. About the “term” – but not about the concept. A concept is a 
firmly defined term that the author outlines clearly and then tries to keep stable. I am not invested in 
stabilizing words in that way. Instead, I take it that terms shift and change – get adapted as they travel. 
Hence, the question you ask about journeys may be reflected back on the terms in which we get to 
talk about those journeys. Terms, like technologies and other things, do not necessarily stay stable as 
they travel. They are fluid. Here is the story. 
A region is a bounded space. A network – such as it was outlined in early actor network theory – 
was rather a syntax, a way of connecting elements. The original idea was that if a technology worked 
in two different regions (say, Sweden and Nicaragua) apparently the network held stable in both 
sites. In both regions there were enough, and similar enough, relevant elements around it that could 
stabilize it. That is what Bruno Latour meant when he introduced this tempting term “immutable 
mobiles”: things that do not change (are immutable) while they get transported (are mobile) from one 
region to another. 
What we added to that (I did this in work with John Law5 and Marianne de Laet6) is that there 
are also “mutable mobiles”: things that keep working from one region to another, not because they 
stay the same, but rather because they adapt themselves. With Law5 we proposed this in relation 
to the ‘anemia’ – diagnosed and treated differently by Dutch doctors in the Netherlands and Dutch 
doctors practicing in diverse settings in rural Sub-Sahara Africa. Anemia travels while it transforms, we 
wrote. It is fluid. That is where we introduced the idea that the space in which “anemia” remains the 
same is a fluid space. It does not have a regional shape, it is no network. It is fluid. In that context we 
imported the term topology from mathematics – where this is a term for a space through which an 
object shifts shapes but does not rupture. I don’t cling to that term very much. What I find important 
is: that we do not take the three dimensions and linear scales of Euclidean space as the only way to 
imagine spatial reality. 
With De Laet6 we wrote about a bush pump in Zimbabwe that kept working, not because it was 
fixed and never broke, but because if was adaptable and easy to repair. There have been various good 
critiques of that piece – that both build on it and amend it. Thus, Uli Beisel and Tillman Schneider7 
warned the rest of us that fluidly adaptable may sound nice, but that is not always nice. If the 
technology involved is not a water pump but a car, and if this is adapted from an ambulance to a bush 
taxi, this may lead on to bumpy rides and an increased risk of accidents. And what happens to the car 
once it is broken? It gets discarded which raises further problems. In his turn, Peter Redfield8 argued 
that the bush pump that we studied in the late nineties may have held promises at the time, and may 
have looked beautiful to us, but was tied to a kind of nation state politics that is no longer in place. 
He makes a contrast with a straw that cleans water but is a small, marketable good. A very compelling 
comparison!
I give these examples to illustrate that rather seeking to fix concepts, such as topology, or fluids, I 
find it more relevant to engage in conversations about the realities our words help to explore. The aim 
of doing theory, after all, is not to fix and consolidate some highbrow verbal apparatus, but to find 
ways to give words to rising concerns or to old concerns that continue to be pressing but in a new form. 
Within the social sciences, there is a growing interest in ontology. Some theoreticians talk about 
an “ontological turn.” You have an important article on “Ontological Politics9”. Could you 
comment on this interest, and on your own particular treatment of it?
This term ‘ontology’ in the social sciences is doing different things for different authors. In 
anthropology it can be used to stress that different cultural traditions do not just attach different 
meanings to the same solid reality – the reality that Western science alone knows for sure – but 
that people order ‘reality’ seriously differently – and may, in their own ways, compete with Western 
science. May have different “ontologies”. That is a fine use of the term.
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 My own use of “ontologies” is slightly different. In the nineteen nineties we were exploring how we could escape from the overwhelming ‘truth character’ of biomedical registers. And what we 
invented is: by contrasting different ways of speaking the truth and then show that they clashed. For 
me, this had started in the early eighties with the question “what a woman is10”. If different disciplines 
answered the question ‘what a woman is’ in different ways, without taking each other for granted, 
then that gave feminist a lot of freedom, too. We no longer had to take any of them as fixed and 
given. It was always possible to ask: why, when, where is this truth realized? What does it depend on? 
What are its alternatives? 
When we started to use “ontology” in that context, the idea was to play with that term in a 
provocative way. In post-Kantian philosophy ontology had been the term for a reality that the sciences 
could never reach as they inevitably sought to know it in their own categories, their own terms. We 
said: but the point is not to reach out to reality and never reach it – in knowledge practice realities (in 
the plural) are various brought into being. In order to stress that we mobilized the old term ontology, 
put it in the plural and tried to give it a new meaning. Not as preceding knowledge, but as done, 
enacted, performed, in the processes of knowing.
At the time, climate change deniers, and so on, where not yet an issue. Later they emerged and that 
complicates the analysis. Where first we had needed to stress the flexibility and diversity of knowledge, 
later insisting on the limits of that adaptability became relevant as well. As it is, I am concerned that 
when terms like ‘ontological politics’ get fixed and firmed up, it becomes difficult to adapt our work to 
what is relevant here and now. With politicians thinking they are free to belief of not belief scientists 
who warn them about global warming, we might need other terms. Nobody should get the idea that 
ontology readily obeys the decrees of rulers.
There have been some difficulties in the Portuguese translation of the term “Ontological politics”. 
You state that this is a composite term: a joining of ontology, used in standard philosophical 
parlance to define that which “belongs to the real, the conditions of possibility we live with,” 
with the term politics. Therefore, the term “politics” underlines the process of shaping reality and 
its character as that which is “both open and contested”. The suggestion is that “the conditions 
of possibility are not given”. Further on, you bring up the issue of choice, and choice derives 
from multiplicity; therefore, from ontologies in the plural. Trying to follow the argument, the 
translation could be “Ontologias políticas”, i.e., if we talk about reality as multiple, then ontology 
is best used in the plural, and if reality is performed in many different manners, the issue of 
politics becomes foremost. Thus, it is not a policy but a philosophical position that implies choice, 
and therefore has political implications. However, various colleagues in Brazil and Portugal have 
translated the term as Política Ontológica. “Política,” in Portuguese, means the art or science of 
governance. Therefore, the translation would imply that opting for an open-ended ontology is 
a political act with governamentality effects. It would be wonderful if you could help us on this 
translations issue, perhaps by telling us how you translate the term in English.
If you give me this short lesson in Portuguese, it is easy for me to tell you which translation I prefer: 
the first one. Ontologias políticas. For indeed the point is that reality does not come in a single version, 
but is multiple. There is not just one ontology – be it closed or open ended, rich or rigid. What with 
our work we tried to stress is that ‘ontology’ does not precede knowledge practices, but is done 
(performed, enacted) in these practices. And because there are many practices, there are also many 
ontologies.
But where various practices are closely linked, such as in a hospital, the ontologies are linked as 
well, in practice. Hence, the “word” best be put in the plural, but we are not talking pluralism. The 
different versions of reality that are done in hospitals are connected. A patient who talks to a doctor in 
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a consulting room may receive a clinical diagnosis, while laboratory measurements ‘do’ her disease in 
a different way. However, these versions of reality relate: the lab tends to come after the consulting 
room. What is more, the normal values of the laboratory tend to be established by measurements on 
people who are clinically normal – hence there one version includes the other. 
Reality might be organized differently – for instance the lab could come first – the blood pressure 
in everybody’s ankles could be measured, say, every year. That is the “politics” part, that things may 
be organized in different ways. But I would not want to call this a choice. I wrestle with that in my 
text about ‘ontological politics’. There may be different possibilities, but often there is not a clear cut 
moment where a ‘choice’ is practically organized. And choices do not just follow from there being 
different ways of doing things. They also depend on there being moments where these different 
ways can be considered and weighed and where it is then possible to go one way or rather the 
other. Take the organization of health care: in most cases the starting point of care is not population 
measurements, but people going to the doctor because they feel they have a problem. This is so 
firmly embedded in so many institutions that it would be hard to change. It would also be far too 
expensive. Hence, where might the choice lie?
In your book The Logic of Care11, the word “patient” carries an association with passivity and 
subordination to the biomedical model from the very beginning. In Brazil, patients in the public 
health system are referred to as “users” and not as “patients.” Taking advantage of your 
invitation to use the ideas in your book actively, it would be especially interesting to consider 
the professional formation of health care professionals in Brazil by introducing the concepts 
of “doctoring” and “patientism” in a creative and contextualized way. Could you comment 
further on these concepts?
The association of patient and passive is an etymological fact. In my “Logic of Care”11 book I mention 
it and turn against it. I write about ‘active patients’ – if only because modern day patients with chronic 
diseases have to do so much. A doctor may “prescribe” pills, but the patient is the one who has to 
“take” them. Remember them, find them, swallow them. This already indicates why the term ‘user’ 
is not particularly fitting. For this suggest that there is something on offer that a person may ‘use’ – 
there is health care, please, come in, pay, and make use of it. But usually that is not the situation. One 
may “use” the services of a laboratory that offers blood measurements – once in a while. But the rest 
of the time, at home, people with chronic diseases have to do their care themselves, including a lot of 
measurements. They do not “use” health care, but do health care, are actively engaged in it. 
The term “doctoring” suggest a particular way of doing, of working, that is not linear. It resonates 
with tinkering, with trying and adapting and trying again. If you look it up in an English dictionary, 
‘doctoring’ also stands for cheating. But I turn against that meaning of the term, I suggest that that 
meaning follows on from expecting processes to be linear and follow a straight course. In situations 
where we have no firm control – and I would argue that means in “most” situations – doctoring is a 
good word for attempts to still get things done.
And the term “patientism” I suggested in analogy to “feminism”. In the “Logic of Care”11 I argue 
against the liberal model of the rational decision maker (see also question 11). Rather than having to 
fit with the model of the buyer or the citizen, I suggest, patients should be taken seriously as what 
they are – as somehow coping with a disease, that throws up problems, that they try to tame and live 
with one way or another. This is not just their particular deviant situation, but when it comes to it a 
more fitting model for many other moments. Just like “feminism” refuses the idea that men are ideal 
humans, “patientism” refuses the illusion that being fully healthy is the standard situation in life.
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In Ziek is het woord niet12, written with Peter van Lieshout, you examine medicalization and the 
monopoly of medicine. Yet in “Differences in Medicine”13, written with Marc Berg, you seek to 
distance yourselves from medicine as a coherent and unified way of thinking, showing a variety 
of forms of practicing Western medicine. In your ethnography of Hospital Z, in “The Body 
Multiple”1 – in which you focus on medicine, medical knowledge, medical technology, medical 
diagnostics, and medical interventions – you explore medical differences from within. Has your 
perception of medicine changed throughout your intellectual trajectory? Could you comment on 
this trajectory?
In the book Ziek is het woord niet12 (published in 1989) we do not study “medicalization” but the 
“term” “medicalization”. And we argue that that term does not fit very well with what happened 
in Dutch health care in the forty preceding years, that is between 1945 and 1985. For when it was 
first coined the “term” medicalization was not just used to talk about the monopoly of medicine. It 
was more particularly used to indicate that various behaviors that were earlier condemned on moral 
grounds (like having homosexual relations; or getting pregnant without being married) had gradually 
come to be called deviances. They were turned into a medical concern – but still not accepted. 
What we saw in the Dutch medical journals we analyzed was that from the sixties onwards general 
practitioners and mental health practitioners were themselves reflexive about this and sought to limit 
and restrict their domain. They did not want to medicalize. Moreover, they fairly rapidly stopped 
calling homosexuality and single motherhood deviances. Other things were going on. 
Hence, in relation to your question, I have not changed very much – just asked different questions 
time and again and investigated different materials and settings.
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In your proposal of a logic of care, you critique “Western clichés,” with their valorization of 
individuality and autonomy. What are the relations between these values and practices of care? 
You define “practices of care” as heterotopias. Can you speak more about this subject?
Sure I can speak more about it, I wrote a whole book about it… But to go short. I called practices of 
care a heterotopia, because they offer a site, a place, which is other to the dominant western ideal of 
individuals who make rational choices. In care practices this ideal doesn’t work so well – if only because 
people do not ‘choose’ to have, say, type 1 diabetes (the case that I follow in my book11). Instead, this 
happens to them. It is not attractive at all, it is a problem they face, or a set of problems. And then, 
say, they do not ‘choose’ to measure less often than their nurse suggested they should, but this may 
still happen. Somehow they may fail to get their daily life organized in accordance with the many life 
rules that come with their disease. They may not get their act together. That is my point: care is not 
first and foremost about making decisions, but about getting things organized in practice. All too many 
social scientists had repeated each other by saying that in care practices people are oppressed and 
dominated. Of course this may happen, but it is not inherent to care practices. Domination is opposite 
of choice. The opposite of care is neglect. 
Hence, the interest of studying the heterotopia of care is to learn about other, non-liberal, caring 
ways of organizing our life and our practices. 
You aim to establish dialogue with epidemiology, especially thinking of the idea of “collectives.” 
How can we mobilize epidemiology in a different way? How can we create different categories?
Different categories get created all the time. For instance, in relation to some concerns epidemiology 
makes a difference between “women” and “men”. However, in relation to other concerns it doesn’t, 
but rather differentiates between “premature born” and “born after full gestation”. Elsewhere again, 
it makes categories like “people with diabetes” and “people without diabetes”; or “young adults” 
and “the elderly”. And so on and so forth. Categories get made that fit the concerns of a particular 
setting – be it research or health policy. So “we” – if by we you mean social scientists – can make 
categories according to what fits our research, too. Sometimes it makes sense to contrast “Brazilians” 
and “Dutch”. But not always. Sometimes it makes more sense to differentiate between, say, “people 
working in universities”, “people working in industry”, “professionals”, “the jobless” – and so on. As 
you know fully well, in some settings Brazilian and Dutch academics have more in common with each 
other than with the people with whom they share the streets. It is somewhat strange that the same 
categories – of gender, class and race/ethnicity – keep appearing again and again in social science text. 
These are obviously relevant categories, but they are not relevant always and in relation to everything. 
The art is to always be attentive to what matters, to what “exactly” matters, in this or that specific 
practice. 
The art for an academic is to not get caught in concepts, but to think while adapting the tools we 
think with for the problems at hand.
Translated by Samantha Serrano
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